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Abstract User authentication can rely on various factors (e.g., a pass-
word, a cryptographic key, and/or biometric data) but should not re-
veal any secret information held by the user. This seemingly paradoxical
feat can be achieved through zero-knowledge proofs. Unfortunately, naive
password-based approaches still prevail on the web. Multi-factor authen-
tication schemes address some of the weaknesses of the traditional login
process, but generally have deployability issues or degrade usability even
further as they assume users do not possess adequate hardware. This as-
sumption no longer holds: smartphones with biometric sensors, cameras,
short-range communication capabilities, and unlimited data plans have
become ubiquitous. In this paper, we show that, assuming the user has
such a device, both security and usability can be drastically improved
using an augmented password-authenticated key agreement (PAKE) pro-
tocol and message authentication codes.
1 Introduction
User authentication still typically involves transmitting a plaintext password to
the web server, which is problematic for many reasons. First, an attacker could
obtain the user’s password using malware, a keystroke logger, phishing, or a
man-in-the-middle attack. Second, the user might be using the same password
on different websites, allowing a malicious server operator to impersonate the
user. Third, if the website’s database is breached, although passwords may be
protected by a hash function, a brute-force attack could reveal low-entropy pass-
words. Fourth, as password-reuse and low-entropy passwords are problematic,
users are constantly advised to pick new, long, complicated passwords. Finally,
transmitting the password over a secure channel, storing it as a hash, and using
a random salt as well as a strong cryptographic hash function are recommended
measures, but they are impossible to enforce or even verify for the end user. The
unsalted SHA-1-hashed passwords of millions of LinkedIn users were disclosed
in 2012 [8] and hundreds of millions more were disclosed (with corresponding
email addresses) in 2016 [5], for example.
Two-factor authentication (2FA) supposedly reinforces standard passwords.
Typically on today’s web, the time-based one-time password (TOTP) algo-
rithm [10] is used to generate a new 6-digit code every 30 seconds, based on
the current time and a secret shared between the server and the user’s authenti-
cation device (i.e., either a dedicated token or a smartphone). Usually, the user
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must submit their one-time code after the traditional username/password step.
For this reason, two-factor authentication is also referred to as “2-step verifica-
tion” [6].
Although 2FA may protect users against certain attacks, it doesn’t com-
pletely prevent them. Schneier [12] claims that it “doesn’t solve anything”. In-
deed, an attacker could still obtain the password and a one-time code—or hijack
the session—through a real-time attack [13]. The attacker could then “make
any fraudulent transaction he wants”, which includes changing the password
and deactivating 2FA to gain long-term control over the user’s online account.
Passwords are still weak and typed on untrusted devices. Servers still receive
plaintext passwords. Password re-use is still problematic. All secret values may
still be known by the server. Finally, assuming that an attacker manages to un-
cover a large number of passwords, the entropy of a 6-digit code is too low to
rule out a brute-force attack. Therefore, TOTP-based authentication alleviates
neither website owners nor users from the consequences of password leaks.
Herein we challenge some of the assumptions underlying existing schemes. For
example, should we still assume that authentication devices have no Internet
access? Clearly, the fact that a smartphone may not have Internet access at
all times should be taken into account, but such a situation has become the
exception rather than the rule. Also, is it sufficient to supplement a weak form
of authentication with a “second step”? We believe, on the contrary, that user
authentication should be completely reassessed.
Besides security, usability is actually deteriorated by schemes based on the
TOTP algorithm. Every time users want to log in, they must type an ever-
changing code displayed on their device—in addition to their password. The
scheme we present, ZeroTwo, on the other hand, would fit inside a streamlined
process, where the user only enters a username or email address on the web-
site and then approves the login/authorization request in a single step on their
smartphone. ZeroTwo relies on an augmented PAKE1 protocol and message au-
thentication codes (MACs) to provide the server with a zero-knowledge password
proof (ZKPP) and evidence that the legitimate user explicitly authorized critical
actions.
Another problem that has been largely overlooked in previous work is that
users share their credentials with friends and family [15]. This problem can
be solved by moving critical parts of the authentication process to the user’s
smartphone, which allows them to remotely give someone they trust a restricted,
temporary, and revokable access to their online account.
2 Protocol Overview
In this section, we provide an overview of how users can authenticate and explic-
itly authorize actions using ZeroTwo.We chose to base our scheme upon SRP [20]
because mature implementations are available. We also borrowed concepts from
1 also referred to as asymmetric password-authenticated key establishment or aPAKE
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AugPAKE [14]. In principle, however, any PAKE protocol (e.g., OPAQUE [7])
could be used to develop a scheme similar to ours.
2.1 Notation
Table 1 shows the notation we use throughout the paper. The values n and g are
agreed upon beforehand. All arithmetic is performed modulo n. H() and HK()
denote a hash function and an HMAC, respectively.
Table 1. Notation Summary
n large safe prime number, i.e., n = 2q+1 where
q is also prime
g primitive root modulo n
k multiplier parameter, k = H(n, g)
l public parameter, l = (H(n) xor H(g))
Iu user’s identifier (username or email address)
Is server’s identifier (domain name)
P password and/or biometric input
p master secret (see Section 3)
x effective secret, discarded after the computa-
tion of the verifier, x = H(Iu, Is, p)
v verifier, v = gx
a, b ephemeral private keys
A,B corresponding public keys
u scrambling parameter, u = H(A, B)
S common exponential value
K session key
M authorization (evidence that K is known)
d duration of the session
o operation to authorize
2.2 Initialization
During sign up, the following operations must be performed:
1. The user chooses a unique identifier Iu and sends it to the server (from a
browser).
2. The server replies with a QR code containing both the user identity Iu and
the server identity Is as well as the URL that the smartphone must use to
send the initialization data.
3. The user scans the QR code; chooses a master secret p (see Section 3), if
this has not been done before; and the app computes the following:
x = H(Iu, Is, p)
2
2 As in AugPAKE [14] and other previous work [1], but unlike in SRP [20], using a
salt is unnecessary here, as the effective secret is derived from unique identifiers.
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v = gx
4. The user’s identity and the verifier are sent to the previously received URL.
5. The server stores the verifier permanently (if the identifier is valid and not
already used) under the user’s identifier. If the identifier is an email address,
the server should first verify that the user has access to that address.
2.3 Authentication
The authentication process works as follows:
1. The user initiates a login attempt by sending their identifier Iu to the server
(from a browser).
2. The server looks up the user’s verifier v, generates a random ephemeral
private key b, and computes the corresponding public key:
B = kv + gb
3. The server sends its public key B as well as identifiers Iu and Is to both the
browser and smartphone. In the common case, the smartphone is connected
to the Internet and receives B (with a notification), a fingerprint [4,17] of
the public key is displayed on both the smartphone app and the browser,
and the user is asked to make sure that the two fingerprints match. If the
smartphone is not connected to the Internet, the user must select a method
for transferring B from the browser to the app (see Section 2.6).
4. The user can accept the authentication request on their smartphone by en-
tering a password P and/or using an embedded biometric sensor. The master
secret p is then used to compute the session key K, and M , which consti-
tutes evidence that the user authorized a session to be established for a time
period d:
x = H(Iu, Is, p)
a = random()
A = ga
u = H(A,B)
S = (B − kgx)(a+ux)
K = H(S)
M = HK(l, Iu, Is, A,B, d)
5. The user’s identifier Iu, public key A, and proof M , as well as the authorized
duration of the session d are transmitted to the server by the smartphone.
6. The server verifies M by computing its own session key:
S = (Avu)b
K = H(S)
If the received data is correct, the server automatically redirects the client
to the page that required authentication.
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2.4 Explicit Authorization
Following the principle of least privilege and to mitigate session hijacking, web
developers using ZeroTwo may choose to define a set of actions for which explicit
authorization from the user is required. When such an action is requested by the
client, the server generates a human-readable message o describing the action and
sends it directly to the smartphone, with a notification and a random nonce c (for
replay prevention). The smartphone then computes an authorization messageM
with the session key K:
M = HK(o, c)
and sends it to the server. This can also be performed through alternative chan-
nels, as described in Section 2.6.
This general concept is sometimes referred to as “transaction signing”. In the
context of this paper, however, because a shared key is established between the
client and the server, symmetric cryptography is sufficient.
2.5 Session Management
The session keyK is stored on the smartphone and considered valid by the server
for as long as the session is valid (specified with d).
If the user wants to terminate the session before it expires automatically,
then they can send an authenticated logout message M to the server:
M = HK(o), where o = logout.
The user should also be able to logout in the usual way, i.e., from the web
browser, but the above method allows the user (who forgot to logout or was
prevented from doing so by an attacker, for example) to terminate the session
from their smartphone.
2.6 Alternative Channels
A bidirectional communication channel between the smartphone and the server
is needed during the authentication and authorization procedures. The server’s
public key B can simply be displayed as a QR code in the browser and scanned
with the ZeroTwo app. Sending data back to the server from the smartphone
is more challenging, because it may not be possible to establish a direct Inter-
net connection. The WebRTC standard, through a collection of protocols and
APIs, allows modern web browsers to access peripheral hardware, which provides
several solutions to our problem:
– Webcam: A camera connected to or embedded in the terminal (e.g., laptop)
is used to scan a QR code displayed on the smartphone.
– Bluetooth: A Bluetooth connection is established between the smartphone
and the browser to transfer the authentication data.
The user may initiate the authentication process directly from a mobile browser.
In that case, the above methods cannot be used. By definition, however, the
smartphone would need an Internet connection to start the authentication pro-
cedure from the login page and thus an alternative channel would not be needed.
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3 Nature of the Master Secret
One of the advantages of augmented PAKE protocols is that they provide a
great deal of flexibility with regard to the nature of the secret they rely upon. In
other words, the master secret (which we denote p), although it is traditionally
assumed to be a password, can be arbitrary long and of any nature. And because
of the zero-knowledge property of our protocol, no entity can learn anything
about the secret aside from the one who created it. Therefore, the responsibility
of developing a process for generating the master secret that is both secure and
convenient for users lies entirely with the developers of compatible apps.
Our preferred approach consists in generating a random passphrase (e.g.,
composed of lowercase, hyphen-separated words). A passphrase has the advan-
tage that it can be memorized and/or written on a piece of paper to be kept in a
secure location. Moreover, a long passphrase generated at random from a large
set of words has enough entropy to make brute-force and dictionary attacks in-
feasible. The passphrase can be re-used for several websites because the effective
secret x is domain-dependent and the entropy of the master secret is high. The
only disadvantage of a passphrase would be to type it at every login, but it can
be stored on the smartphone.
One could also combine several secrets. Concatenating a key and a password,
for example, would result in a multi-factor scheme. If the same combination is
used on multiple websites, however, changing the password is inconvenient as
all verifiers must be updated. Therefore, it is not clear whether the presumed
security gain would be worth the decrease in usability. Instead, we propose to
protect a high-entropy secret with another factor, as described in Section 4.
A single high-entropy secret is sufficient to protect multiple websites. How-
ever, to avoid a single point of failure, some users might choose to generate
multiple secrets: one for personal websites and one for professional purposes, for
example. Therefore, compatible apps should offer an option to manage multiple
accounts.
4 Access Control, Storage, and Backup
If the master secret is stored on the smartphone, then the access to the ZeroTwo-
compatible app and the storage of the secret should be protected. The two main
options at our disposal are the following:
– Biometric protection: Fingerprint and facial scanners are becoming com-
monplace on high-end smartphones. Android and iOS both provide APIs for
letting developers protect their app with embedded biometric sensors.
– Password protection: Although passwords do not allow for the same ease
of use as biometrics, they offer another advantage: the master secret can be
encrypted before a backup (in cloud storage, for example).
Although we favor the biometrics approach, a password can be used as a
fallback in case the smartphone does not have a biometric sensor, or in case the
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biometric sensor produces a false negative. As for the backup strategy, assuming
the master secret is a passphrase, users should be able to decide whether they
want to only display the passphrase when it is first generated (to memorize it
or write it down) or back it up using a protected cloud storage solution.
We note that a single-secret approach, as opposed to a naive password-based
scheme, scales to an arbitrary number of websites without having to constantly
remember/backup new secrets, which is particularly important should the user
decide to use an offline backup solution.
5 Comparative Evaluation and Related Work
The last couple of decades has seen a plethora of proposals for user authen-
tication. In general, existing schemes suffer from at least one of the following
drawbacks: (a) they require a dedicated device, (b) they are proprietary, (c)
they involve a shared secret, and/or (d) they still require a traditional password.
Herein we only discuss a small subset of schemes and refer to the paper by Bon-
neau et al. [2] for an extensive evaluation of related work. Using their framework
we evaluated ZeroTwo and present the results in Table 2.
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Passwords • • • ◦ • • • • • • • ◦ • • •
ZeroTwo1 • • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • • • • ◦ • • • • • •
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• = offers the benefit; ◦ = almost offers the benefit
Table 2. Comparative evaluation of ZeroTwo, assuming a single passphrase is used
as the master secret. 1Best-case scenario: The smartphone has a biometric sensor to
protect the secret and Internet connectivity is available. 2Worst-case scenario: The
passphrase is protected with a password; the smartphone has no biometric sensor and
no Internet connectivity.
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Bonneau [1] had previously proposed a password-based authentication pro-
tocol, designed to avoid revealing the password to the server (using Javascript),
which requires neither a software update on the client side nor a separate au-
thentication device. Thomas et al. [19] similarly focused on restrictions imposed
by legacy systems to address the issues of weak passwords.
Hardware tokens (such as YubiKey [21] or Pico [16]) have the advantage that
they are shielded from remote attackers. Although they are particularly adapted
to professional contexts, we believe that they are less suited to the general public
as many users are unwilling to spend money for a dedicated device.
Cronto [11] is a phone-based scheme close to our proposal in terms of offered
features, but it is a proprietary product whose exact design is not publicly known,
which makes it hard to analyze and unlikely to be widely deployed outside of
the banking industry. SQRL (pronounced “squirrel”) or Secure Quick Reliable
Login [3] also offers a strong phone-based authentication solution, but it does
not support transaction signing or explicit authorization.
Sound-Proof [9] is a recent system that relies on sound for the smartphone
and browser to communicate. One of the main goals of Sound-Proof is to provide
a seamless experience to users, i.e., the phone need not even be handled for the
authentication process to complete. However, the user still has to type a password
in the browser, which comes with the issues we discussed previously. Moreover,
the complete seamlessness of Sound-Proof is not compatible with our view that
certain actions should be explicitly authorized on a trusted device.
The FIDO Alliance has published a number of protocol, framework, and
API specifications [18] for user authentication on the web, based on public-key
cryptography. To the best our knowledge, none of these specifications rely on
password-authenticated key establishment.
6 Conclusion
Many forms of user authentication on today’s web suffer from severe draw-
backs. Using public-key cryptography for authentication is not a novel idea. But
whereas asymmetric cryptography is commonly used for server authentication
on the web (through TLS), it is not a widespread approach for user authentica-
tion. There are several reasons for this: key management is difficult; users need a
trusted device with storage, communication, and computation capabilities; and
the authentication process must be fast and convenient. We believe, however,
that the democratization of smartphones with embedded biometric sensors, un-
limited cellular data plans, and new communication standards such as WebRTC
now make asymmetric protocols a viable option for user authentication.
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